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Abstract 
Logical Criticism of Buddhist Doctrines is a ‘thematic compilation’ by Avi Sion. It collects in 
one volume the essays that he has written on this subject over a period of some 15 years after the 
publication of his first book on Buddhism, Buddhist Illogic. It comprises expositions and 
empirical and logical critiques of many (though not all) Buddhist doctrines, such as 
impermanence, interdependence, emptiness, the denial of self or soul. It includes his most recent 
essay, regarding the five skandhas doctrine.  
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Sample text (chapters 6 and 9:1-2) 
 
6 “Everything causes everything” 
One doctrine fundamental to Buddhism is the idea that ‘everything causes everything’, or 
‘everything is caused by everything’. This is the idea of universal codependence (or 
interdependence); it is the idea that nothing exists independently of anything else, that all things 
depend for their existence on all other things. This is, note well, a more radical thesis than the 
claim, commonly found in most Western philosophies, that ‘everything has a cause (or a set of 
causes)’.  
On the surface, the Buddhist notion of universal causation seems conceivable, if not profound. 
However, upon reflection it is found to be logically impossible – i.e. utter nonsense. This is made 
evident in the following excerpts from past books. 
 
1. The idea of co-dependence 
The Buddhist idea of ‘co-dependence’ might be stated broadly as each thing exists only in 
relation to others; and furthermore, since each other thing in turn exists only in relation to yet 
others, each thing exists in relation to all the others. The relation primarily intended here is 
causality, note. We tend to regard each thing as capable of solitary existence in the universe, and 
ignore or forget the variegated threads relating it to other things. We ‘do not see the forest for the 
trees’, and habitually focus on individual events to the detriment of overview or long view. 
For example, consider a plant. Without the sunlight, soil and water it depends on, and without 
previous generations of the same plant and the events that made reproduction possible and the 
trajectories of each atom constituting and feeding the plant, and without the cosmic upheavals 
that resulted in the existence of our planet and its soil and water and of the sun and of living 
matter, and so forth ad infinitum, there would be no plant. It has no independent existence, but 
stands before us only by virtue of a mass of causes and conditions. And so with these causes and 
conditions, they in turn are mere details in a universal fabric of being.  
The concept of co-dependence is apparently regarded by Buddhists as an inevitable outcome of 
the concept of causality. But reflection shows, again, that this doctrine is only a particular thesis 
within the thesis of causality. That is, though co-dependence implies causality, causality does not 
imply co-dependence. Moreover, it is a vague thesis, which involves some doubtful 
generalizations. The above-cited typical example of co-dependence suggests three propositions:  
• everything has a cause (or is an effect), 
• everything has an effect (or is a cause); 
and perhaps the more radical, 
• everything causes and is caused by everything.  
The first two propositions are together what we call ‘the law of causality’. It has to be seen that 
these propositions do not inevitably follow from the concept of causality. The latter only requires 
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for its formation that some regularity of co-existence between events be found in experience, but 
does not in itself necessitate that every event in experience be found to have regular co-existence 
with some other event(s). The concept of causality is valid if it but has particular applications; the 
law of causality does not automatically follow – it is merely a generalization from some 
experiences with this property to all existents. There may well be things not found to have regular 
co-existents, and thence by generalization assumed to have no cause and/or no effect. A universe 
in which both causality and non-causality occur is quite conceivable. Furthermore, the first 
proposition does not logically imply the second or vice versa – i.e. we may imagine things with 
causes but no further effect, and things with effects but no preceding causes. 
“Early Buddhists”, Cheng tells us, “believed in the principle of causality to be objectively, 
necessarily, eternally and universally valid.” Many Western philosophers have concurred, though 
not all. Today, most physicists believe that, on a quantum level at least, and perhaps at the Big 
Bang, there are events without apparent cause. I do not know if events without effect are 
postulated by anyone. In any case, we see that even on the physical level “chance” is admitted as 
a possibility, if not a certainty. The law of causality can continue to serve us as a working 
principle, pressing us to seek diligently for causes and effects, but cannot in any case be regarded 
as an a priori universal truth. Causal logic has to remain open-minded, since in any case these 
“laws” are mere generalizations – inductive, not deductive, truths. 
Furthermore, the law of causality just mentioned is only at best a law of causation. Philosophers 
who admit of volition1 cannot consistently uphold such a law as universal to all existents, but only 
in the ‘mechanistic’ domains of physical and psychological events. With regard to events 
involving the will, if we admit that a human being (or equivalent spiritual entity, a higher animal 
or God) can ‘will’ (somehow freely produce) a physiological event (i.e. a physical movement in 
his body) or a psychological event (i.e. an imagination, a mental projection), or even another soul 
(at least in the sense of choosing to reproduce), we have to consider this as an exception to such 
universal law of causation.  
Also, if we consider that the Agent of will is always under the influence of some experience or 
reason, we might formulate an analogical law of causality with reference to this. But influence is 
not to be confused with causation; it does not determine the will, which remains free, but only 
strengthens or weakens it, facilitating or easing its operation in a certain direction. Moreover, it is 
not obvious that will cannot occur ‘nihilistically’, without any influence; it may well be free, not 
only to resist influences but also to operate in the absence of any motive whatsoever. In the latter 
case, the law of causality would again be at best a working principle, not a universal fact that 
volition requires a motive. 
Let us now consider the more extreme statement that ‘everything causes and is caused by 
everything’, which could be construed (incorrectly) as implied by co-dependence. To say this is 
effectively to say paradoxically (as Nagarjuna would no doubt have enjoyed doing!) that nothing 
causes or is caused by anything – for causality is a relation found by noticing regularities in 
contrast to irregularities. If everything were regularly co-existent with everything, we would be 
unable to distinguish causality in the first place. It follows that such an extreme version of the law 
                                                 
 
1  And at least some Buddhists seem to. For instance, the statement in the Dhammapada (v.165) that “by 
oneself the evil is done, and it is oneself who suffers: by oneself evil is not done, and by one’s Self one becomes 
pure. The pure and the impure come from oneself: no man can purify another” – this statement seems to imply 
existence of a self with responsibility for its actions. 
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of causality is logically untenable. Causality cannot imply that ‘everything causes everything’ or 
‘everything is caused by everything’ – and to deny the latter statements does not deny the 
concept, note well. The concept is not derived from such a law, but independently from 
observation of regularities in experience; our ability to discern such regularities from the mass of 
experience implies that there are irregularities too; whence, such an extreme statement cannot be 
consistently upheld. We must thus admit that things do not have unlimited numbers of causes or 
effects. 
Although ‘everything causes everything’ implies ‘co-dependence’, the latter does not imply the 
former; so our refutation of the wider statement does not disprove co-dependence, only one 
possible (extreme) view of it. My criticism of co-dependence would be the following. For a start, 
the doctrine presented, and the illustrations given in support of it, do not use the term causality 
with any precision. First, as we have suggested above, causality, is a broad term, covering a 
variety of very distinct relations: 
• causation or ‘mechanistic’ causality within the material and mental domains, and 
causation itself has many subspecies;  
• volition, or action by souls on the material or mental or spiritual domains, and will has 
many degrees of freedom; and  
• influence, which refers to limitations on volition set by material or mental or spiritual 
entities. 
The doctrine of co-dependence glosses over the profound differences between these different 
senses of the terms ‘cause’ and ‘effect’, using them as if they were uniform in all their 
applications.  
Also to be included as ‘causal relations’ in a broader sense are the negations of these relations. 
Even if some philosopher doubts one, two or all three of these (positive) relations, he would have 
to consider them. Concepts of ‘chance’ or ‘spontaneity’ are not simple, and can only be defined 
by negating those of causality; likewise, the concept of ‘determinism’ requires one of ‘free will’. 
It is only in contrast to causality concepts, that non-causality can be clearly conceived. 
Furthermore, co-dependence ignores that some things are not (positively) causally related to each 
other, even if they may have (positive) causal relations to other things. That something must have 
some cause or effect, does not imply that it has this or that specific thing as its cause or effect; 
there are still things to which it is not causally related. If everything had the same positive causal 
relation to everything, and no negative causal relation, there would be no such thing as causality, 
nothing standing out to be conceived. 
Secondly, if we consider chains (or, in discourse, syllogisms) of causal relations, we find that the 
cause of a cause is not necessarily itself a cause, or at least not in the same sense or to the same 
degree. For instance, with reference to causation, we can formally prove that if A is a complete 
cause of B and B is a complete cause of C, then A is a complete cause of C. But if A is a 
complete cause of B and B is a partial cause of C, it does not follow that A is at all a cause of C. 
Similarly, when we mix the types of causality (e.g. causation and volition in series), we find that 
causality is not readily transmitted, in the same way or at all. It is therefore logically incorrect to 
infer transmission of causality from the mere fact of succession of causal relations as the theory 
of co-dependence does. 
Thirdly, those who uphold co-dependence tend to treat both directions of causal relation as 
equivalent. Thus, when they say ‘everything is causally related to everything’, they seem to 
suggest that being a cause and being an effect is more or less the same. But something can only 
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be regarded as a cause of things occurring after it in time or below it in conceptual hierarchy, and 
as an effect of things occurring before it or above it. Upstream and downstream are not 
equivalent. Thus, ‘interdependence’ cannot be taken too literally, using ‘causal relation’ in a too 
vague sense, without attention to the distinction between causal and effectual relationship. 
Fourthly, the doctrine of co-dependence suggests or calls for some sort of law(s) of causality, and 
as already discussed higher up, no universal or restricted law of causality is logically necessitated 
by the concept of causality, although such a law may be considered a hypothetical principle to be 
validated inductively. The concept of causality only requires that some causality occur, without 
prejudicing how much. So, though co-dependence implies causality, causality does not imply co-
dependence. 
Fifthly, the concept of ‘co-dependence’ is upheld in contrast and opposition to a concept of ‘self-
subsistence’. Something self-subsistent would exist ‘by itself’, without need of origination or 
support or destructibility, without ‘causal conditions’. Buddhism stresses that (apart perhaps from 
ultimate reality) nothing in the manifold has this property, which Buddhism claims ordinary 
consciousness upholds. In truth, the accusation that people commonly believe in the self-
subsistence of entities is false – this is rather a construct of earlier Indian philosophy. 
People generally believe that most things have origins (which bring them into existence), and that 
all things once generated have static relations to other existents (an infinity of relations, to all 
other things, if we count both positive and negative relations as ‘relations’), and that things 
usually depend for their continued existence on the presence or absence of other things (i.e. if 
some of the latter come or go, the former may go too). What is doubtful however, in my view, is 
the vague, implicit suggestion of the co-dependence doctrine, that while a thing is present, i.e. 
during the time of its actual existence, it has a somehow only relative existence, i.e. were it not 
for the other things present in that same moment, it could not stand. 
This is not essentially a doctrine of relativity to consciousness or Subject (though Yogachara 
Buddhism might say so), note well, but an existential incapacity to stand alone. This is the aspect 
of co-dependence that the Western mind, or ordinary consciousness, would reject. In our world2, 
once a thing is, and so long as it is, irrespective of the causes of its coming to be or the eventual 
causes of its ceasing to be, or of other things co-existing with it in time and its relationships to 
those things, or of its being an object of consciousness, it simply exists. It is a done thing, 
unchangeable historical fact, which nothing later in time can affect. It cannot be said to ‘depend’ 
on anything in the sense implied by Buddhists, because nothing could possibly be perceived or 
conceived as reversing or annulling this fact.  
What Buddhism seems to be denying here is that ‘facts are facts’, whatever their surrounding 
circumstances, and whether or not they are cognized, however correctly or imperfectly. It is a 
denial that appearances, whatever their content and whether they be real or illusory, have 
occurred. We cannot accept such deviation from the Law of Identity. 
Such considerations lead me to the conclusion that ‘co-dependence’ is not easy to formulate and 
establish, if at all. Nevertheless, I regard it as a useful ‘way of looking at things’, a valuable rough 
and ready heuristic principle. Also, to be fair, I remain open to the possibility that, at some deep 
level of meditative insight I have not reached, it acquires more meaning and validity. 
                                                 
 
2  We can, incidentally, imagine a world where only one thing exists, without anything before it, simultaneous 
to it or after it. 
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2. Conclusions of first phase of studies 
It must be understood that this research has not been idle reshuffling of information and symbols. 
It had both practical and theoretical purposes in mind.  
The practical questions relate to everyday reasoning about causes and effects. One of the 
principal questions we posed, you will recall, was whether the cause of the cause of something is 
itself a cause of that thing or not, and if it is, to whether it is so to the same degree or a lesser 
degree. This issue of causal (or effectual) chains is what the investigation of causal syllogism is 
all about. What our dispassionate research has shown is that it is absurd to expect ordinary 
reasoning, unaided by such patient formal reflections, to arrive at accurate results. The answer to 
the question about chains is resounding and crucial: the cause of a cause is not necessarily itself 
a cause, and if it is a cause it need not be one to the same degree. Once the scientific impact of 
this is understood, the importance of such research becomes evident. 
But this syllogistic issue has not been the only one dealt with. We have in the process engaged in 
many other investigations of practical value. The definitions of the determinations causation by 
means of matrixes can help both laypeople and scientists to classify particular causative 
relations, simply by observing conjunctions of presences and absences of various items. 
Generalizations may occur thereafter, but they should always be checked by further empirical 
observation (at least, a readiness to notice; eventually, active experiment) and adjusted as new 
data appears (or is uncovered). 
Another interesting finding has been the clarification of the relationships between positive and 
negative, absolute and relative causative propositions: for instance, that we may affirm partial 
or contingent causation, while denying it of a particular complement. One very important 
principle – that we have assumed in this volume, but not proved, because the proof is only 
possible in the later phase of research – is that (absolute) “lone determinations” are logically 
impossible. This means that we may in practice consider that if there is causation at all, it must 
be in one or the other of the four “joint” determinations. 
Another finding worth highlighting is that non-causation is denial of the four genera (or four 
species) of causation, and before these can be definitely denied we have to go through a long 
process of empirical verification, observing presences and absences of items or their negations in 
all logically possible conjunctions. It is thus in practice as difficult to prove non-causation as to 
prove causation! Indeed, to be concluded the former requires a lot more careful analysis of data 
than the latter. Of course, in practice (as with all induction) we assume causation absent, except 
where it is proved present. But if we want to check the matter out closely, a more sustained effort 
is required. 
With regard to the theoretical significance of our findings, now. By theoretical, here, I mean: 
relevant to philosophical discussions and debates about causality. Obviously, so far we have only 
treated causation, and said nothing about volition and allied cause-effect relations, so we cannot 
talk about causality in its broadest sense.  
What our perspective makes clear is that the existence of “causation” is indubitable, once we 
apprehend it as a set of experiential yes or no answers to simple questions, leaving aside 
references to some underlying “force” or “connection” (which might be discussed as a later 
explanatory hypothesis). If we look upon causation in a positivistic manner, and avoid 
metaphysical discussions that tend to mystify, it is a simple matter. Causation is an abstraction, 
in response to phenomenologically evident data. It is a summary of data.  
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It is not purely empirical, in the sense of a concept only summarizing presences of phenomena. It 
involves a rational element, in that it also summarizes absences of phenomena. Affirmation may 
only be acknowledgment of the empirically apparent. But negation, as I have stressed in my work 
Phenomenology3, is a partly rational act (a question is asked: is the thing I remember or imagine 
now present to my senses?), as well as a partly empirical act (the answer is no: I see or hear or 
otherwise sense nothing equivalent to that image!). Absence does not exist independently like 
presence, but signifies an empirically disappointed mental expectation. 
Reading debates between philosophers (for example, David Hume’s discussions), one might get 
the impression that non-causation is an obvious concept, while causation needs to be defined and 
justified. But, as we have seen here, non-causation can only be understood and proven with 
reference to causation. Before we can project a world without causation, we have to first 
understand what we mean by causation, its different determinations, their interactions, and so 
forth. But the moment we do that, the existence of causation is already obvious. However, this 
does not mean that non-causation does not exist. Quite the contrary. Since, as we have seen, some 
formal processes like syllogism with premises of causation are inconclusive, we may say that the 
existence of causation implies that of non-causation! This finding has two aspects:  
(a) The more immediate aspect is inferred from the fact that the cause of a cause of something is 
not necessarily itself a cause of it: taking any two things at random, they may or not be 
causatively related. This implication is valuable to contradict the Buddhist notion that 
“everything is caused by everything”. But the possibility of independence from some things 
does not exclude dependence on other things. Each of the two things taken at random may 
well have other causes and effects than each other. 
(b) A more radical aspect is the issue of spontaneity, or no causation by anything at all. We can 
only touch upon this issue here, since we have only dealt with causation so far. But what our 
formal study of causation has made clear is that we cannot say offhand whether or not 
spontaneity in this sense is possible. There is no “law of causation” that spontaneity is 
impossible, i.e. that “everything has a cause”, as far as I can see. Nothing we have come 
across so far implies such a universal law; it can only be affirmed by generalization. 
Spontaneity (chance, the haphazard) remains conceivable. 
I think the point is made: that formal research such as the present one has both practical and 
theoretical value. Let us now explain why the research undertaken so far is insufficient. 
 
3. Conclusions of second phase of studies 
The universal causation doctrine predicts that every existent has at least some causative 
relation(s) to some other existents. This is usually understood in a moderate sense as only some 
other things cause each thing, but Buddhism understands it more extremely as all other things 
cause each thing. This ‘universal universal causation’ is referred to as the interdependence (or 
codependence) of all things. 
We normally suppose that only the past and present can cause the present or future; and indeed, 
this principle should primarily be read that way. But some might go further and claim that time is 
transcended by causation, and that literally everything causes everything; I am not sure Buddhism 
                                                 
 
3  This final chapter of Phase One was written in 2003, after publication of Phenomenology. 
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goes to that extreme. Note also that, in truth, Buddhism intends its interdependence principle 
restrictively, as applicable only to dharmas, i.e. the transient phenomena constituting the world of 
appearances; in the higher or deeper realm of the quiescent and undifferentiated “original ground” 
there is no causation. 
Be it said in passing, this version of “karmic law” must be distinguished from the narrower 
statement, which most of us agree with, that actions have consequences. The latter does not imply 
the former! More deeply, I think what the Buddhists really meant by their law of karma was that 
each human (or other living) being is somewhat locked within recurring behavior patterns, very 
difficult (or impossible) to get out of. This is another issue, concerning not causation but volition. 
That is the sense of “the wheel”: our cultural and personal habits as well as our physical 
limitations, keep influencing our behavior and are reinforced by repetition. Much meditation and 
long-term corrective action are required to change them; they cannot be overcome by immediate 
measures, by a sheer act of will. We are thus burdened by a “baggage” of karma, which we carry 
out through our lives with usually little change; it may be lightened with sustained effort, but is 
more likely to be made heavier as time passes. 
If we logically examine the claim that “everything causes everything”, we see that if everything is 
causatively connected to everything else, then nothing is without such connection to any other 
thing, let alone without causative connection to anything whatsoever. That is, this doctrine is 
effectively a denial that relative as well as absolute non-causation ever occurs, which no one in 
Western culture would admit. To evaluate it objectively, let us look back on the findings in the 
present volume. 
First, in defense of the idea of interdependence, it should be recalled that when we discussed the 
significance of the “last modus” in any grand matrix (modus #16 for two items, or #256 for three, 
etc.), which declares any combination of the items concerned or their negations as possible (code 
1 in every cell of the modus), we saw that there was an uncertainty as to whether this indicated 
causation (or more broadly, connection) or its absence. If the last modus could be shown on 
formal grounds to indicate causation in all cases, then all contingents in the universe would have 
to be considered as causatively related to all others (i.e. any two contingents taken at random 
could be affirmed as causatively related, specifically in the way of the partial contingent 
determination, pq). 
However, since such formal demonstration is lacking, and the idea is anyway disagreeable to 
common sense (at least that of non-Buddhists), we estimated that the science of Logic had to keep 
an open mind and grant the possibility of the alternative interpretation, namely that two items 
may or may not be causatively related to each other (i.e. relative non-causation is possible), and 
moreover that spontaneity (i.e. absolute non-causation) is at least conceivable in some cases. 
However, in this context, the Buddhist thesis of interdependence, remains a legitimate formal 
postulate. But note well, only a possible alternative hypothesis; and not a very probable one for 
most observers (those of us who believe in freewill, for example; as well as physicists who reify 
the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle). 
An important formal criticism we can level against the notion of interdependence is to ask what 
manner or degree of causation is meant by it. The term ‘causes’ in ‘everything causes everything’ 
is used very vaguely. Is only causation intended, to the exclusion of volition? And if causation is 
intended, surely this is meant broadly to include prevention? And are the different determinations 
of causation admitted, i.e. strong (complete and/or necessary) as well as weak (partial and/or 
contingent)? The definition of causation traditionally attributed to the Buddha is: 
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“When this is, that is; this arising, that arises. When this is not, that is not; this ceasing, 
that ceases.” 
 
This definition would suggest that only complete necessary causation is intended. But other 
discussions within Buddhism suggest that this definition is only intended as a paradigm, as the 
most obvious case, and partial and contingent causation is also in practice admitted, as use of the 
plural in the expression “causes and conditions” testifies. We may regard prevention as formally 
subsumed by all these concepts, by negation of an item. Some discourses also seem to accept 
volition, but this need not concern us here. Focusing, then, on causation in a broad sense, we may 
make the following criticism. 
If everything is causatively related to everything else, then the only conceivable kind of causation 
would be weak (both partial and contingent). For strong causation (complete and/or necessary) 
surely implies a certain exclusiveness of relationship between the items. If all items are involved 
to some degree in the existence of a given item, then none of those causes can be claimed to 
predominate. So finally, it seems to me, this Buddhist doctrine of multilateral causation requires 
all bilateral causative relations to be weak, and ultimately abandons strong determinations 
(including mixtures), and all the more so the strongest determination (which it originally rightly 
claimed as the definition of causation). 
One way to show that the interdependence theory implies specifically a ‘universal weak link’ is 
as follows. If we claim interdependence to apply indiscriminately to all ‘things’, i.e. not only to 
experiential things (dharmas), but also to abstract things, we fall into formal difficulties as soon 
as we suppose some causative relations to be strong. For then such abstract relations (i.e. 
causations) also count as ‘things’, and are therefore subject to interdependence. We might thus 
ask how a cause can be complete or necessary when that relationship is itself dependent on some 
yet other cause: we are forced to contradict our premise and conclude that the cause is not as 
complete or necessary as it seemed. 
I suppose the proposed state of affairs (universal interdependence) is formally conceivable, 
although I do not see on what grounds we could possibly allow such rejection in one fell swoop 
of a large number of moduses (i.e. all alternative moduses concerning the strong determinations). 
Unless a reasonable formal or empirical ground is provided, there is no justification in such a 
radical measure: it would constitute prejudice. The Buddhist claim is of course based on a 
meditative experience; but since this is esoteric, not readily available to all observers at will, we 
must remain critical and view it as speculative. We cannot categorically eliminate it on firm 
rational grounds, but we cannot just take it on faith. 
It should be realized that causation is a conceptual object, not a percept. Before we can discern a 
causative relation between two or more percepts (and all the more so between concepts) we have 
to distinguish the percepts from each other (and conceptualize them by comparison and contrast 
of many percepts, in the case of concepts). Also, causation refers to negation, which is a product 
of rational as well as empirical factors. Thus, if we approach the issue of causation with respect to 
the phenomenological order of things, we must recognize that it is a rather high-level abstract, 
although of basic importance in the organization of knowledge. It is not something we just 
directly see or otherwise sense. For this reason, we may remain skeptical that there is some flash 
of insight that would instantly reveal the causal relations of all things in the universe. 
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Thus, while the interdependence doctrine apparently does not give rise to formal inconsistency, 
we have good reason to doubt it with reference to normal human knowledge development. 
Causation is ordinarily known only gradually, through painstaking observation and analysis of 
particular data, always subject to review and revision as new data makes its appearance and 
possible contradictions are encountered. Our minds are not omniscient or rigidly deductive, but 
cumulative and flexibly inductive: we proceed by trial and error, constantly adjusting our 
positions to match up with new input and logical insight. Therefore, we cannot rely on sweeping 
statements, like that about interdependence, without being very careful. 
Of course, some philosophers would argue back that causation as such is a man-made illusion, 
since pure experience only reveals undifferentiated presence. Differentiation into ‘distinct’ 
percepts, and finding that some sought things are ‘absent’, and conceptualization on the basis of 
‘similarities and differences’, are all acts of reason. Indeed, if all perceived appearances are 
regarded as mere wave motions in a single, otherwise uniform substrate of existence (the ‘original 
ground’ of Buddhists or the Unified Field of physicists), then the boundaries we think we 
perceive or conceive for individuated things are in fact mere fictions, and all things (including 
even our fantasies about causation) are ultimately One in a very real sense.  
So let us keep an open mind either way, and cheerfully move on. I just want to add one more 
small set of reflections, which the Buddhist idea of interdependence generated in me. This idea is 
often justified with reference to causal chains4. I tried therefore to imagine the world as a large 
body of water, like Lake Geneva say. According to this theory, supposedly, a disturbance 
anywhere in the lake eventually ripples through the whole lake, to an ever-diminishing degree but 
never dampening to zero. I then translated this image into the language of causal chains, for 
purposes of formal evaluation. 
Looking at the results of macroanalysis, one would immediately answer that the Buddhist 
expectation is wrong. As we have seen, a cause of a cause of something is not necessarily itself a 
cause of that thing; and even if it is a cause, it may be so to a lesser degree. Many first figure 
syllogisms yield no causative conclusion, although their premises are compatible. Some do yield 
a conclusion, but that conclusion is often weaker in determination than the premises. Thus, we 
have formal reasons to doubt the idea of interdependence, if it is taken to imply that ‘a cause of 
cause of something is itself in turn a cause of that thing’. 
All the same, I thought, thinking of the movement of disturbances in the lake, there is some truth 
in the contention. I then thought that maybe we should conceive of ‘orders of causation’ – and 
postulate that even “if A causes B and B causes C, but nevertheless A does not syllogistically 
cause C” is true in a given case in terms of first-order causation, it can still be said that A causes 
C in second-order causation. And we could perhaps continue, and declare that if the latter 
(meaning, causes a cause of) is not applicable in a given case, we could appeal to a third order of 
causation, etc. We might thus, in an attempt to give credence to all theories, explain the Buddhist 
notion as involving a diluted sense of ‘causation’. 
This idea seemed plausible for a while, until I got into microanalysis. In the latter approach, 
conclusions are given in terms of alternative moduses. There is no room for a fanciful, more 
abstract, additional order of causation: the result would be identical, still the same number (one or 
more) of legitimate alternative moduses. No useful purpose would be served in inventing new 
                                                 
 
4  See for instance Thich Naht Hanh, The Heart of Understanding. 
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(narrower or broader) sets of alternative moduses, and giving such groups new names. We could 
only at best regard all moduses in a grand matrix (other than the first, composed of all zeros) as 
indicative of some ‘causation’ (in a maximal sense), and so say that any alternative modus found 
at the conclusion of a syllogistic intersection is ‘residual causation’. 
But having reached this bottom line, we see how trite the suggestion is. 
 
4. Conclusions of third phase of studies 
We should also here mention the cognitive role of alleged laws of causation. We have already 
briefly discussed laws relating to space and time. 
In times past, it seems that some degree of sameness between cause and effect was regarded as an 
important law of causation. Upon reflection, the proponents of this criterion for causation 
probably had in mind that offspring have common features with their parents. But apparently, 
some people took this idea further and supposed that the substance (and eventually some other 
characteristics) of cause and effect must be the same. But though this criterion may be applicable 
to biology or other specific domains (e.g. the law of conservation of matter and energy in physics 
could be so construed), it is not generally regarded as universal. Formally, I see no basis for it.5 
The law of causation most often appealed to (at least in Western thought) is that ‘everything has a 
cause’. But though it is evidently true of most things that they have causes, and the belief in this 
law often motivates us to look for or postulate causes (i.e. even if none is apparent, we may 
assume one to exist), we have not in our study found any formal grounds to affirm such a law as 
universal. Admitting the fact of causation does not logically force us to admit its universality. 
This does not prove that it is not empirically universal; and it does not prevent us from 
formulating such universality as an adductive hypothesis. In any case, today, as evidenced by 
quantum physics and big-bang cosmogony, it seems generally assumed by scientists that this law 
is indeed not universal (which does not mean it is not very widely applicable). 
I wonder anyway if it was ever really regarded as universal. I would say that in the 19th Century, 
this law was assumed universal for physical phenomena – but not necessarily for mental 
phenomena; human volition was generally taken to be an exception to the rule, i.e. freedom of the 
will was acknowledged by most people. Paradoxically, in the iconoclastic 20th Century, while the 
said law of causation was denied universality for material things, every effort was made to affirm 
it as regards human beings and thus forcefully deny freedom of the will6. Intellectual fashions 
                                                 
 
5  If we want to go more deeply in the history of ‘laws of causation’, we would have to mention, among 
others, the Hindu/Buddhist law of karma, according to which one’s good and bad deeds sooner or later have desirable 
or undesirable consequences, respectively, on oneself. It is the popular idea that ‘what goes around must come 
around’. Though I would agree this is sometimes, frequently or even usually empirically true, we must admit that it 
does not always seem confirmed by observation – so it is at best a hopeful generalization (to a life after this one) 
intended to have positive moral influence. In any case, I see no formal basis for it. The same can be said concerning 
reward or punishment by God – though it might well be true, it is not something that can readily be proved by 
observation or by formal means; an act of faith is required to believe in it (I do, on that basis). In any case, the latter 
can hardly be called a ‘law of causation’, since the free will of God is thought to be involved in bringing about the 
effect. 
6  Actually, both these changes were (I suggest) consciously or subconsciously motivated by the same evil 
desire to incapacitate mankind. Their proponents effectively told people: “you cannot control matter (since it is 
ultimately not subject to law) and you cannot control yourself (since you have no freewill) – so give up trying”. 
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change, evidently. But as far as I am concerned, while I admit the possibility that this law may 
not-be universally true of matter, I have no doubt that it is inapplicable to the human will7. 
Another alleged law of causation that should be mentioned here (because of the current interest in 
it, in some circles) is the Buddhist notion that ‘every thing is caused by everything’. As I have 
shown in the present volume, this idea of universal ‘interdependence’ is logically untenable. It is 
formally nonsensical. Indeed, if you just think for a moment, you will realize (without need for 
complex formal analysis) that to affirm interdependence is to deny causation, or at least its 
knowability. Every concept relies on our ability to distinguish the presence and absence of the 
thing conceived; if it is everywhere the same, it cannot be discerned. I think the Buddhist 
philosopher Nagarjuna can be said to have realized that; and this would explain why he ultimately 
opted for a no-causation thesis. However, that does not mean that causation can logically be 
denied: as already explained earlier, it cannot. 
Well, then. Are there any ‘laws of causation’? Of course there are, a great many! Every finding 
concerning the formal logic of causation in this volume is a law of causation, a proven law. For 
instance, the fact that not all positive causative syllogisms yield a positive conclusion of some 
sort is an important law of causation, teaching us that a cause of a cause of something is not 




1. Impermanence: concept and principle 
Buddhist meditators attach great importance to the principle of impermanence. They consider that 
if one but realizes that “everything is impermanent”, one is well on the way to or has already 
reached Realization. 
However, the principle proposed by Buddhism should (in my view) be approached more critically 
than its proponents have hitherto done. They have taken for granted that such a principle is 
immediately knowable, in the way of a direct experience, and have not given enough attention to 
the epistemological issues this notion raises. 
To be sure, we can and do commonly have direct experience of some impermanence: that of 
present changes. Whereas we might rationally analyze change in general (when it occurs) as an 
instant replacement of one thing by its negation, many phenomena of change evidently occur in a 
present moment (an extended amount of time). If, for example, you watch a dog running, you are 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
People who believed this nonsense (including its advocates) were influenced by it to become weaker human beings. 
Virtue was derided and vice was promoted. We see the shameful results of this policy all around us today. 
7  I argue this issue elsewhere, in my Volition and Allied Causal Concepts. It should be mentioned that an 
analogue to the law of causation is often postulated, consciously or not, for the mind. We tend to think that every act 
of volition has a cause, in the sense of being influenced or motivated, by something or other. Though largely true, 
this assumption taken literally would exclude purely whimsical volitions; thus, I tend to doubt it, for reasons 
explained in my said book. In any case, do not confuse this ‘law of influence’ with the ‘law of causation’ here 
discussed. These are very distinct forms of causality, which cannot be lumped together. 
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not personally experiencing this sight as a series of successive stills of the dog in different 
positions, but as one continuous series of moves. 
A good meditation on such evident impermanence is meditation on water8. One sits or stands 
calmly in front of a body of water (the sea, a river, a lake, a puddle), watching the movements on 
its surface – reflections on it, waves or wavelets, currents, droplets of rain, listening to the sounds. 
I find this practice both soothing and a great source of understanding about life. 
But we must keep in mind that the concept of impermanence covers a wider range of experiences 
than that: it includes changes not sensible in a present moment, but only inferred over time by 
comparing situations experienced in distinct moments, whether contiguous or non-contiguous. 
Such inferences imply a reliance on memory, or an interpretation of other present traces of past 
events. Still other changes are known even more indirectly, through predominantly conceptual 
means. 
Generally speaking (i.e. including all sorts of experience under one heading): we first experience 
undifferentiated totality, and then (pretty much automatically) subdivide it by means of mental 
projections and then conceptually regroup these subdivisions by comparing and contrasting them 
together. Buddhist philosophy admits and advocates this analysis: the subdivision and 
conceptualization of the phenomenological given is, we all agree, ratiocination (i.e. rational 
activity); it is reason (i.e. the rational faculty) that mentally “makes” many out of the One. 
It follows from this insight (we may now argue) that impermanence cannot be considered as a 
primary given, but must be viewed as derived from the imagined subdivision and conceptual 
regrouping of the initially experienced whole. Even to mentally isolate and classify some directly 
experienced particular change as “a change” is ratiocination. All the more so, the 
“impermanence” of each totality of experience, moment after moment, is an idea, obtained by 
distinguishing successive moments of experience; i.e. by relying on memory, and comparing and 
contrasting the experience apparently remembered to the experience currently experienced.  
The latter act, note well, requires we cut up “present experience” into two portions, one a 
“memory” (inner) appearance and the other a more “currently in process” (inner and/or outer) 
appearance. This is rational activity; so, “impermanence” is in fact never directly experienced 
(contrary to Buddhist claims). Unity phenomenologically precedes Diversity; therefore, the 
experience of diversity cannot logically be considered as disqualifying the belief in underlying 
unity. 
This argument is not a proof of substance, but at least serves to neutralize the Buddhist denial of 
substance. It opens the door to an advocacy of substance9 by adductive means, i.e. in the way of a 
legitimate hypothesis to be confirmed by overall consideration of all experience and all the needs 
of its consistent conceptualization.  
                                                 
 
8  The Greek philosopher Heraclites must have practiced this meditation, when he reportedly wrote “you 
cannot step into the same river twice”. This meditation is commonly practiced, even unwittingly. Other similarly 
natural meditations consist in watching rain falling, wind blowing through trees, clouds shifting in the sky, 
candlelight flickering, or the sparks and flames of a camp or chimney fire. “Watching” of course here means, not just 
being aware of sights (shapes and colors), but also awareness of sounds, touch-sensations, temperatures, textures, etc. 
9  Note well that an issue within the thesis of substance is whether we advocate a single, undifferentiated 
substance, or a multiplicity of distinct substances. To admit of substance is not necessarily to uphold the latter, 
pluralist view. In Physics, the unitary substance view would be that matter is all one substance, vibrating in a variety 
of ways. 
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Note well that I am not here denying validity to the concept of impermanence, but I am only 
reminding us that “impermanence” is a concept. Being a concept based on experience of change, 
it is indeed a valid concept. This is true whether such change be considered as real or illusory: it 
suffices that such change appears phenomenologically for a concept of it to be justified. 
The principle of impermanence is more than that the mere concept. It is a generalization of that 
concept. It is not a mere statement that change exists – it is a statement that only change exists, 
i.e. that everything is continually changing and there is no underlying rest. Now, such a general 
proposition logically can simply not be validated with reference to experience alone. There is no 
epistemologically conceivable way that, sitting in meditation, the Buddha would be able to 
experience this (or any other) principle directly.  
This principle (like any other) can indeed conceivably be validated as universal, but only by 
adductive methodology. It must be considered as a hypothesis, to be tested again and again 
against all new experiences, and compared to competing hypotheses as regards explanatory value. 
The result is thus at best an inductive truth, not a pure experience or a pure deduction from 
experience.  
Furthermore, in addition to the generalization from particular experiences of change to a 
metaphysical principle of the ubiquity of change, the principle of impermanence involves a 
second fundamental generalization. Since it is a negative principle, it involves the act of 
generalization inherent in all negation; that is, the generalization from “I found no permanence in 
my present experience” to “There was no permanence to be found in my present experience”. 
While the conclusion of negation by such generalization is not in principle logically invalid, it is 
an inductive, not a deductive conclusion. It stands ab initio on a more or less equal footing with 
the competing speculation that there might well be an underlying permanence of some sort. The 
latter positive hypothesis could equally well be (and sometimes is) posited as a postulate, to be 
gradually shown preferable to the negative assumption using adductive means. 
Even within meditation, note, constancies do appear side by side with changing phenomena, if we 
pay attention to them. Thus, for instance, if I meditate on water, I may reflect on the inconstancy 
of its surface; but I may also reflect on the underlying constancy (during my period of meditation, 
at least) of the horizon or shoreline, or of rocks in or around it, or simply of the fact of water, or 
its color and consistency, etc. I may, moreover, later discover that water is uniformly composed 
of H2O. 
Seen in this light, the status of the principle of impermanence is considerably less sure. To 
present such a principle as an absolute truth knowable directly or obtained by some sort of 
infallible analysis of experience would be dishonest. 
All this is not said to annul the important moral lessons to be drawn from observation of 
impermanence. A “principle” of impermanence may still be proposed, if we take it as heuristic, 
rather than hermeneutic – i.e. as a useful “rule of thumb”, which helps us realize that it is useless 
to attach importance to mundane things, and enjoins us to strive for higher values. Beauty is 
passing; pleasures are ephemeral. Life is short, and there is much spiritual work to be done… 
With regard to predication of impermanence, it is relevant to ask whether the concrete data 
(experiences, appearances) referred to are phenomenal or non-phenomenal, i.e. whether they can 
be physically or mentally seen, heard, felt, smelt or tasted, or instead are intuited. To indicate that 
the data at hand is phenomenal, and so particularly transient, does not in itself exclude that 
relatively less transient non-phenomenal data might also be involved behind the scenes. That is, 
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while current objects might be perceivably transient, it does not follow that the one perceiving 
them is equally transient. 
Of course, whether the data is phenomenal or not, it may still be transient. However, transience 
has degrees. Data may be merely momentary, or it may appear more continuously over a more 
extended period of time. The issue here is not “transient or eternal”, as some Buddhist 
philosophers seem to present it. The issue is “momentary or continuous” – with the eternal as the 
extreme case of continuity. It is analytically erroneous to ignore or exclude offhand periods of 
existence that are longer than a mere ‘moment’ of time and shorter than ‘eternity’. 
Moreover, as already pointed out, the underlying claim that all phenomena, or for that matter all 
non-phenomenal events, are transient is not something that can be directly observed – but can 
only be based on generalization. There is no a priori logical necessity about such ontological 
statements – they are epistemologically bound to be inductive. Even if all appearances 
experienced by me or you so far seem transient, there might still be eternal existents our own 
transience makes us unable to observe.  
Conversely, only an eternal being could experience eternity – and it would take such a being… an 
eternity to do so (not a mere few hours, days or years of meditation)!10 This however does not 
exclude the possibility of ascribing eternity to certain things on conceptual deductive grounds. 
For example, I can affirm the laws of thought to be eternally true, since they are incontrovertible; 
or again, I can affirm all contradictions or exclusions of a middle to be eternally false. 
Furthermore, Buddhists implicitly if not explicitly ascribe some sort of eternity to the existential 
ground in or out of which all transient phenomena bubble up. That is, although particular 
existents may well all be transient, the fact of existence as such is eternal. Therefore, their 
argument is not really intended as a denial of any permanence whatsoever (as it is often 
presented), but more moderately as a denial of permanence to particular existents, i.e. to 
fragments of the totality. And of course, in that perspective, their insight is right on. 
 
2. Not an essence, but an entity 
Buddhist philosophers have stressed the idea of impermanence, with a view to deny the existence 
of “essences” in both the objective and subjective domains. However, an impermanent essence is 
not a contradiction in terms. This means that the question of essences is more complex than 
merely an issue of impermanence. Several epistemological and ontological issues are involved in 
this question. We have indicated some of these issues in the preceding chapters. 
                                                 
 
10  I am not sure of the truth of this statement of mine. I have in the past argued (among other reasons so as to 
provide an argument in favor of the doctrine that God can tell the future) that this issue hinges on the span of time an 
onlooker can perceive in one go. The higher one is spiritually placed, the longer a ‘moment’ of time covers. God, 
who is “above it all”, at the peak of spiritual perspective, can see all time (all the things we class under the headings 
of past, present and future) as the present moment. Proportionately, when we humans meditate, the present is longer, 
i.e. the ‘moment’ of time our attention can include at once is enlarged. Thus, one (conceivably) need not wait forever 
to experience eternity, but may ultimately do so through spiritual elevation. This may be the “eternal now” 
experience many people have reported having. Note additionally that, if we accept this hypothesis, we have to apply 
it not only to external events (i.e. phenomenal physical and mental experiences) but also to inner experience (i.e. 
intuitions of cognitions, volitions and valuations by self). The latter is more difficult, more problematic, because it 
implies that one’s own being and experience is already consumed, i.e. all telescoped into the present. Still, why not. 
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With regard to the objective domain, comprising the material and mental objects of experience, 
i.e. the phenomena apparently experienced through the senses or in the mind – their reasoning is 
that we never perceive firm “essences” but only constantly changing phenomena; whence, they 
conclude, the objects we refer to are “empty”. 
In reply, I would say that it is true that many people seem to imagine that the “entities” we refer 
to in thought (e.g. a dog) have some unchanging core (call it “dog-ness”), which remains constant 
while the superficial changes and movements we observe occur, and which allow us to classify a 
number of particulars under a common heading (i.e. all particular dogs as “dogs”). 
But of course, if we examine our thought processes more carefully, we have to modify this 
viewpoint somewhat. We do “define” a particular object by referring to some seemingly constant 
property (or conjunction of properties) in it – which is preferably actual and static, though (by the 
way) it might even be a habitual action or repetitive motion or a mere potential. 
Note too, there may be more than one property eligible for use as a definition – so long as each 
property is constant throughout the existence of that object and is exclusive to it. The defining 
property does not shine out as special in some way, and in some cases we might well arbitrarily 
choose one candidate among many. 
However, defining is never as direct and simple an insight as it may at times seem. It requires a 
complex rational activity, involving comparison and contrast between different aspects and 
phases of the individual object, and between this object and others that seem similar to it in some 
respects though different from it in others, and between that class of object and all others. Thus, 
the property used as definition is knowable only through complex conceptual means. 
Therefore, our mental separation of one property from the whole object or set of objects is an 
artifice. And, moreover, our referring to all apparently similar occurrences of that property as 
“one” property gives the impression of objective unity, when in fact the one-ness is only in the 
mind of the beholder (though this does not make it unreal). In short, the definition is only an 
abstraction. It indeed in a sense exists in the object as a whole, but it is only distinguishable from 
the whole through cognition and ratiocination. 
The material and mental objects we perceive are, therefore, in fact nothing other than more or less 
arbitrary collections of phenomena, among which one or more is/are selected by us on various 
grounds as “essential”. The “essence” is a potential that can only be actualized relative to a 
rational observer; it has no independent actual existence when no observer is present. Definition 
gives us a mental “handle” on objects, but it is not a substitute for them. 
An entity is not only its definition. An entity is the sum total of innumerable qualities and events 
related to it; some of these are applicable to it throughout its existence (be that existence transient 
or eternal) and some of them are applicable to it during only part(s) of its existence (i.e. have a 
shorter duration). Although the defining property must be general (and exclusive) to the object 
defined, it does not follow that properties that are not or cannot be used for definition cease to 
equally “belong to” the object. 
It is inexcusably naïve to imagine the essence of an entity as some sort of ghost of the object 
coterminous with it. In fact, the entity is one – whatever collection of circumstances happens to 
constitute it. The distinction of an essence in it is a pragmatic measure needed for purposes of 
knowledge – it does not imply the property concerned to have a separate existence in fact. The 
property selected is necessarily one aspect among many; it may be just a tiny corner of the whole 
entity. 
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We may thus readily agree with Buddhists that named or thought-of objects are “empty”; i.e. that 
it is inaccurate to consider each object as really having some defining constant core, whether 
phenomenal or non-phenomenal. But the Buddhists go on from there are apply the same 
reasoning to the Subject (or soul) – and this is where we may more radically disagree. 
They imply that the Subject of cognitions is itself cognized by way of phenomena, i.e. like any 
other object. This idea of theirs has some apparent credibility due to the fact that they confuse the 
Subject with his ‘inner’, mental phenomena11. But though such phenomena are indeed internal in 
comparison to physical phenomena sensed in the body or further out beyond it, they are strictly 
speaking external in comparison to the “soul”. 
Anyone who reflects a little would not regard, say, the stuff of a dream he had as himself. His 
self-awareness is the consciousness of something more inward still than the stuff of imaginations. 
He is the one experiencing and generating the imaginations. The soul is not a phenomenon – it 
has no smell, taste, solidity, tune or color; it is something non-phenomenal. 
The self is not perceived as an object in the way of mental phenomena (as the Buddhists suggest), 
but is intuited directly in the way of a Subject apperceiving itself (at least when it perceives other 
things, or when it expresses itself through volition or valuation). Our soul is not a presumed 
“essence” of our mental phenomenal experiences; it is an entirely different sort of experience. 
Of course, it could still be argued that – even granting that acts of cognition, volition and 
valuation are non-phenomenal events, known by self-intuition – such acts are mere momentary 
events, which do not necessarily imply an underlying non-phenomenal continuity (an abiding 
self). Admittedly, the fact that we cannot physically or mentally see, hear, smell, taste or touch 
the acts of the self does not logically imply that the self is abiding. 
However, note that this last is an argument in favor of the possibility that the self may be 
impermanent – it does not constitute an argument against the existence of a self (whether lasting 
or short-lived) underlying each act of cognition, volition or valuation. That is, these functions are 
inconceivable without someone experiencing, willing and choosing, even if it is conceivable that 
the one doing so does not abide for longer than that moment.12 
To deny that cognition, volition and valuation necessarily involve a self is to place these apparent 
events under an aetiological régime of natural determinism or spontaneity. That subsumes willing 
under mechanistic causation or chance happenstance – i.e. it effectively denies the existence of 
freewill. 
                                                 
 
11  See the Buddhist doctrine of the Five Component-Groups. In this doctrine, the fourth and fifth groups, 
comprising the “determinants” and the “cognitive faculty”, are particularly misleading, in that cognition, volition and 
valuation, the three functions of the self, are there presented without mention of the self, as ordinary phenomenal 
events. That is, the doctrine commits a petitio principii, by depicting psychic events in a manner that deliberately 
omits verbal acknowledgment of the underlying self, so as to seem to arrive at the (foregone) conclusion that there is 
no self. No explanation is given, for instance, as to how we tell the difference between two phenomenally identical 
actions, considering one as really willed by oneself, and the other as a reactive or accidental event – for such 
differentiation (which is necessary to gauge degrees of responsibility) is only possible by means of self-knowledge, 
i.e. introspection into one’s non-phenomenal self, and they have dogmatically resolved in advance not to accept the 
existence of a cognizing, willing and valuing self. 
12  Note well that I am careful to say the possibility that the self is impermanent; which does not exclude the 
equal possibility that the self is permanent. The mere fact that the cognitions, volitions and valuations of the self are 
impermanent does not by itself allow us to draw any conclusion either way about the permanence or impermanence 
of the self. Additional considerations are needed to draw the latter conclusion. 
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Similarly, it implies that there is no more to knowing than the storing of symbols in a machine (as 
if the “information” stored in a computer has any knowledge value without humans to cognize 
and understand it, i.e. as if a computer can ever at all know). And again, it implies that valuing or 
disvaluing is no more relevant to a living (and in particular sentient) being than it is to a stone. 
The effective elimination of these three categories (i.e. knowing, willing and valuing) by 
Buddhists (and extreme Materialists, by the way) is without logical justification, because in total 
disaccord with common experience. 
The confusion may in part be caused or perpetuated by equivocation. Because we often use the 
word “mind” – or alternatively, sometimes, “consciousness” – in a loose, large sense, including 
the soul, it might be assumed that the soul is similar to mental phenomena in its substance. But 
the soul and mind are only proximate in a spatial sense, if at all. The soul is not made of mental 
stuff or of consciousness – the soul uses consciousness to observe mental and physical events 
(and, indeed, its intimate self). 
The self or soul is not an abstraction from mental or physical phenomena. It receives and 
cognizes mental and material information (and it indirectly chooses and wills mental and material 
events) – but it is not identical with such information (or events).  
Only intuited events of cognition, volition and valuation can be considered as truly parts of, and 
direct responsibilities of, the soul. And even here, it would be inaccurate to necessarily equate the 
soul to these functions. Such a positivistic approach is a hypothesis to be adopted inductively 
only if we find no good reason to adopt the alternative hypothesis that the soul is more than the 
evidence of its functioning. 
Thus, the inevitable impermanence of the phenomenal world cannot be construed as necessarily 
implying a similar impermanence for the self. Even granting that material and mental objects are 
“empty”, it does not follow that the self is a non-entity, i.e. non-existent as a distinct unit. The self 
is not a material or mental substance or entity – but it is a non-phenomenal substance and entity. 
We may legitimately label that distinct substance ‘spiritual’ and that entity ‘soul’. 
Note well that such labeling does not preclude the idea, previously presented, that the individual 
soul’s individuation out from the universal spiritual substance or universal soul is ultimately 
illusory. We may thus well consider the soul as impermanent in its individuality, while regarding 
its spiritual substance as eternal. 
Upon reflection, this is pretty much the way we view the phenomenal realm, too – as consisting 
of impermanent illusory individual entities emerging in a permanent real universal substratum. 
Their illusoriness is mainly due to the conventionality of their individual boundaries. 
At this stage, then, we find ourselves with two ‘monistic’ domains – the one giving rise to 
material and mental phenomena and the other giving rise to spiritual entities (souls). Obviously, 
such double ‘monism’ is not logically coherent! We therefore must assume that these two 
apparently overlapping domains are really ultimately somehow one and the same. 
So, we have perhaps come full circle, and our opinions end up pretty much coinciding with the 
Buddhists’ after all. We ought perhaps to lay the stress, instead, on our difference with regard to 
continuity. 
According to Buddhist theory, the self has no continuity, i.e. our self of today is not the same 
person as our self of yesterday or of tomorrow. In this perspective, they are causatively 
connected, in the sense that earlier conglomerations of phenomena constituting a self ‘cause’ later 
ones – but there is no thread of constancy that can be identified as the underlying one and the 
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same entity. It is not a case of mere succession of totally discrete events; but there is no essential 
identity between the events, either. 
However, many (myself included) object to this theory on various grounds. While we may admit 
that one can logically regard selfhood (i.e. being a Subject and Agent) as punctual at every instant 
without having to assume its extension over a lifetime, we must realize that such an assumption 
removes all logical possibility of a concept of moral responsibility for past actions.  
If one is no longer ever the same person as the person committing a past virtuous or vicious act, 
then no good deed may be claimed by anyone or rewarded, and no crime may be blamed on 
anyone or punished. Ex post facto, strictly speaking, the doer of any deed no longer exists. 
Similarly, looking forward, there is nothing to be gained or lost by any Agent in doing anything, 
since by the time any consequences of action emerge the Agent has already disappeared. 
In such a framework, all personal morality and social harmony would be completely destroyed. 
There would be no justification for abstaining from vice or for pursuing virtue. Even the pursuit 
of spiritual realization would be absurd. Of course, some people do not mind such a prospect, 
which releases them from all moral obligations or responsibility and lets them go wild. 
It is very doubtful that Buddhism (given its overall concerns and aims) supports such a nihilist 
thesis13. In any case, such a viewpoint cannot be considered credible, in the light of all the above 
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13  Although the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna seems to relish it. 
